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Abstract 
 
This paper notes that a high sterilization coefficient plus a de facto pegged exchange rate 
indicates the existence of dual nominal anchors. The econometric evidence presented 
shows that several Caribbean economies with fixed exchange rate regimes also possess 
high sterilization coefficients. Given open capital accounts in the various economies, the 
paper argues that this finding contravenes the money neutrality thesis, which holds that 
only one nominal anchor can prevail in the long-term. The paper presents a simple 
theoretical model to explain this phenomenon. The model combines the liquidity 
preference of commercial banks with an augmented uncovered interest parity equation.    
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, it estimates the sterilization 
coefficients for several Caribbean countries. This has not been done except for a recent 
paper by Jara and Tovar (2008). However, above mentioned paper reports a single index 
of sterilization for the entire Caribbean in order to facilitate comparison with Latin 
America. Our study would therefore extend the literature by providing estimates of the 
sterilization coefficients for countries in the Caribbean Region. The findings may also be 
of interest to academics and practitioners since the magnitude of the sterilization 
coefficient encodes information on the central bank‟s monetary policy stance. For 
instance, a coefficient of -1 implies all foreign exchange market interventions are 
neutralized by the central bank.  In this case, the central bank is keen to maintain a 
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monetary target.  On the other hand, a sterilization coefficient of 0 implies all changes in 
the central bank‟s net foreign reserves are reflected in the monetary base.  Thus, a foreign 
exchange target would tend to be the monetary objective.   
Secondly, the study will also contribute to the literature by providing a conceptual 
framework for understanding why regional economies with fully pegged exchange rate 
regimes have not allowed the money supply to be endogenous to capital flows
1
. 
Specifically it would offer a possible explanation as to why some Caribbean economies 
were able to pursue two nominal anchors in spite of theoretical consensus.  According to 
the literature, mini-states (like those in the Caribbean) would not be able to pursue an 
independent monetary policy in light of capital flows (Khatkhate and Short, 1980). 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) also noted the tendency for capital flows to complicate 
monetary policy. Moreover, they noted that in a fixed exchange rate regime economy 
with perfect capital mobility the domestic money supply becomes passive or endogenous. 
Yet the estimated sterilization coefficients portray evidence of active sterilization (acts to 
insulate the monetary base from the effects of foreign exchange market interventions) by 
the central banks in economies with fixed exchange rate regimes
2
.  This is indicative of 
the existence of dual nominal anchors, which contravenes the money neutrality thesis in 
an open economy setting
3
. Two simultaneous conditions must be present in order for dual 
                                                 
1
 Data on capital flows are provided in Appendix 1 (Tables A2, A3 and A4); Jara and Tovar (2008) also 
provided a rich set of data for the Caribbean and Latin America.   
 
2
 It should be noted that Boamah et al (2005) noted the complete liberalization of the capital account for 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Worrell et al (2008) noted that there are no controls on capital 
inflows into Barbados and the regulation on outflows is “more liberal in practice than is intended to be, 
because of the fungibility of finance.” 
 
3
 For an excellent explanation of the money neutrality thesis in an open economy context in which 
exchange rate policy matters see Montiel (2003, chapter 17). Montiel emphasized that money neutrality 
holds regardless of the degree of capital mobility.   
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anchors to exist: (i) there must be a high sterilization coefficient; and (ii) the country 
must have at least a de facto pegged exchange rate. We use the IMF‟s classification of 
exchange rate regimes in order to establish the existence of a de facto pegged rate. The 
two conditions, moreover, must hold in a regime of capital account liberalization.  
In order to explain the existence of long-term dual anchors, this paper submits the 
thesis of oligopolistic interest rate formation by private commercial banks, the dominant 
financial institutions in the Caribbean. The thesis holds that private oligopolistic banks 
mark-up interest rate above a foreign benchmark interest rate – thus preventing the 
central bank‟s monetary policy actions from engendering offsetting capital movements as 
predicted by the uncovered interest parity (UIP) theory and the IS-LM-BP model. The 
model combines the mark-up interest rate and an aggregate bank liquidity preference 
curve (given the stylized facts). At the mark-up interest rate the liquidity preference curve 
is horizontal. This allows us to model the aggregate liquidity demand function as a 
reciprocal equation, which when combined with an augmented UIP (with a mark-up 
term) enables us to analyze the effect of monetary policy on the exchange rate.   
The sterilization coefficient is estimated for each of the following countries: the 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago and 
the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU), which comprise of Antigua and 
Barbuda, Anguilla, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
4
.  These economies are all members of the Caribbean 
Single Market and Economy (CSME).   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
 There is a large literature which focuses on the effectiveness of sterilization in light of the pursuit of an 
independent monetary policy in a world of rapid capital flows. See for instance Obstfeld (1982), Frankel 
(1997), Sarno and Taylor (2001), Disyatat and Galati (2005) and Mohanty and Turner (2005).    
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents background data 
that are essential to the analysis in later sections. Section 3 describes the econometric 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical findings.   Section 5 outlines the analytical 
framework and section 6 concludes.    
2. Background Information  
The central bank‟s balance sheet constraint necessitates that5 
NDA NFA RM  (where RM = reserve money or the monetary base).  Thus a change in 
net domestic assets (NDA) or net foreign assets (NFA) would be reflected as a change in 
RM. Therefore, given a constant money multiplier (the money multiplier is simply broad 
money divided by RM) this change will be reflected in a change in the level of money 
(M1 and M2)
6
.  Therefore, if the central bank wants to maintain a monetary target it must 
intervene in the domestic money market to neutralize any changes in NFA owing to prior 
foreign exchange market interventions. In other words, when the central bank 
accumulates foreign assets it must first purchase the foreign currencies by using the 
domestic currency. 
When 0NFA   the monetary base would increase; the central bank could then 
sell domestic assets (its own sterilization bonds or government Treasury bills) from its 
stock of domestic assets (or NDA). When the NDA is exactly equal to the NFA there is 
complete neutralization or sterilization, and the NFA  has no effect on the monetary 
base.  In this case the sterilization coefficient is equal to -1.  A coefficient of 0 implies the 
changes in international reserves are completely reflected in the money supply; while a 
                                                 
 
5
 Assume net worth = 0 for simplicity.   
 
6
 The direction of causation could be reversed in the case of endogenous money (Goodhart, 2009). 
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value between 0 and -1 signals partial sterilization.  Should the central bank be concerned 
with only an exchange rate target, its reaction function should possess a low sterilization 
coefficient.  However, should the central bank have both an exchange rate and a money 
supply (or policy interest rate) target it would maintain high sterilization activities, which 
will show up as a high absolute coefficient value. Therefore, for dual anchors to exist 
there must be a high sterilization coefficient and a de facto exchange rate peg.   
Table 1, presenting the IMF (2006) classification of exchange rate regimes, shows 
that each country maintains a de facto pegged exchange rate.  Jamaica is classified as a 
managed float. Interestingly, however, Guyana‟s nominal exchange rate (G$/US$) has 
demonstrated noticeable changes since 1993, whereby the rate has tended to depreciate 
more than appreciate.  The IMF, nevertheless, classifies Guyana‟s exchange rate as a 
fixed peg.  The likely reason for this has to do with the remarkable stabilization of the 
rate since 2004 (relative to the earlier period 1993 to 2003).  In 2004 the largest state 
owned commercial bank was privatized and merged with another large private 
commercial bank, thus forming the largest commercial bank and institutional foreign 
exchange trader.  Therefore, it could be that the seemingly „fixed peg‟ is due to trader 
market power since a few commercial banks are the dominant foreign exchange market 
dealers in Guyana
7
.   
Moreover, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are often seen in the 
Caribbean as economies with managed floats (Worrell, 2003).  In addition, Worrell 
acknowledges that Trinidad and Tobago provides the Caribbean‟s example of the 
phenomenon known as “fear of floating.”  As a result, there is substantial intervention by 
                                                 
7
 This issue is beyond the scope of this paper and it is the subject of a separate research project. 
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the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago in the domestic foreign exchange market.  
Worrell further noted that the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize and the ECCU have acted as 
quasi-currency boards since the 1970s. 
       
Table 1. De facto classification of exchange rate and monetary regimes 
 
    
Monetary policy 
framework 
  
Exchange 
rate  
regime 
Monetary 
aggregate  
target 
Other 
monetary  
policy 
framework 
The Bahamas Fixed peg _ _ 
Barbados Fixed peg _ _ 
Belize Fixed peg _ _ 
ECCU 
Currency 
board - 
 fixed peg _ X
1
 
Guyana Fixed peg
2
 X _ 
Jamaica 
Managed 
float X _ 
Suriname Fixed peg X _ 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Fixed peg
3 
_ _ 
1
 Grenada, a member of the ECCU, has an IMF supported  
monetary program 
2
 Prior to 2004 the exchange rate demonstrated relatively more 
flexibility, although it tended to depreciate more than appreciate.  
 
3
Caribbean economists tend to recognize the Trinidad and Tobago 
and Guyana currency regimes as a managed float (Worrell, 2003).      
Source: IMF (2006) 
 
Table 2 shows that the eight Caribbean central banks have accumulated foreign 
exchange reserves over the period 1993 to second quarter 2008.  This is consistent across 
all eight countries.  Buoyed by high oil prices, Trinidad and Tobago has seen significant 
reserve accumulation.  There has also been a substantial accumulation of foreign reserves 
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in the Bahamas, Barbados, the ECCU and Jamaica.  For the purpose of this article, 
however, we would like to know to what extent the increase in foreign reserves is 
allowed to be reflected in the monetary base. In other words, has each territory pursued 
an active policy to neutralize the monetary effects of foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation? 
 
Table 2. Foreign exchange reserves minus gold (US$ millions) – selected years 
  1993 1995 1997 2000 2002 2005 
2008: 
Q2 
The Bahamas 172.3 179.2 227 349.6 380.6 586.3 685.1 
Barbados 150.4 219.1 264.9 472.7 668.5 603.4 888.6 
Belize 38.7 37.6 59.4 122.9 114.5 71.4 138 
ECCU 261.1 312.9 307.8 386.4 508.2 600 799.4 
Guyana 247.4 268.9 315.8 304.9 284.4 251.9 381.4 
Jamaica 417.1 681.3 682.1 1053.7 1645.1 2169.8 1917.5
a
 
Suriname 17.7 132.9 109.1 63 106.1 125.8 445.3 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 206.3 358.2 706.4 1386.3 3168.2 4960.8 8776.3 
a
 2007: Q4 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 
3. Methodology and Data Issues  
When estimating the central bank‟s reaction function it is important to note that 
the potential exist for simultaneity bias if domestic monetary operations engender an 
“offset” of net foreign assets (Kouri and Porter, 1974).  The hypothesized empirical 
reaction function, represented by a distributed lag model, is specified by equation 1, 
which is similar to the one used by previous authors (Aizenman and Glick, 2008; Siklos, 
2000; Kouri and Porter, 1974).  In an economy with developed capital and money 
markets and rapid capital flows, NFA is likely to be endogenous and therefore 
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correlated with the error term 
t .  In a developed financial market system, according to 
Kouri and Porter (1974) and Herring and Marston (1977), the NDA leads to net 
offsetting portfolio changes in the international reserves position and the balance of 
payments (thus NFA ). The NFA  is also likely to be endogenous when domestic and 
foreign assets are perfect substitutes or at least highly substitutable.  However, this 
depends on the degree of capital account openness, the level of financial sophistication, 
and the risk profile of the economy under study.      
0 0 1
n p
t i t i k t k ti k
NDA NFA NDA                 (1) 
Where S
i
p
g
D
 
 
   
 
 
 
  The sterilization coefficient is denoted by 0 which assume values ranging from 0 
to -1.   The vector Z includes other exogenous variables in the reaction function to which 
the central bank reacts by varying NDA.  The term p represents the rate of inflation; 
while Sg denotes the rate of growth of the nominal exchange rate
8
.  iD denotes seasonal 
dummy variables.    is a row vector of coefficients.  The coefficients on p and Sg are 
expected to be negative, signaling that the central bank contracts monetary policy when 
the inflation and/or nominal exchange rate increases.  The study also examines whether 
the central banks respond to the inflation gap *p p ; where *p represents the trend rate 
of inflation which is extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  The coefficients on the 
quarterly dummies are expected to take positive or negative values.                   
                                                 
8
 The output gap is sometimes included in the reaction function (see Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Kouri and 
Porter (1974) include the change in aggregate output. However, we are unable to do so because quarterly 
GDP data are unavailable.   
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In view of potential simultaneity bias, several researchers have used two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) to estimate the sterilization coefficient and an offset coefficient, 
simultaneously, by inverting equation 1 to make NFA the subject of the equation.  This 
strategy was adopted by Cumby and Obstfeld (1984), Obstfeld (1982), and Brissimis, 
Gibson and Tsakalatos (2002).  Recently, however, several authors have estimated the 
sterilization coefficient with OLS (see for instance Aizenman and Glick, 2008; Jara and 
Tovar, 2008; and Kwack, 2001), while others have estimated the coefficient using both 
2SLS and OLS (see Siklos, 2000).   
In this article it is not taken as given that NFA is endogenous to domestic 
monetary policy.  There are good reasons to believe that capital flows and thus NFA are 
exogenous to domestic policy
9
.  Firstly, domestic and foreign securities are not perfect 
substitutes.  One study, Birchwood and Seerattan (2006), has confirmed the previous 
point. Birchwood and Seerattan found that uncovered interest parity (UIP) does not hold 
for three Caribbean economies – Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago – vis-à-vis 
the US dollar.  This condition is unlikely to prevail when commercial banks mark-up 
domestic interest rates over a foreign rate. Secondly, domestic financial markets (both 
money and capital markets) are underdeveloped and as a result monetary policy is not 
likely to transmit into immediate rapid changes in short-term and long-term interest rates 
(Ramlogan, 2004).   
Given the above we will test whether NFA is indeed endogenous in the reaction 
function.  In this regard, we follow a test outlined by Wooldridge (2009) to determine 
whether 2SLS is appropriate.  The test involves estimating a reduced-form regression for 
                                                 
9
 Kwack (2001) also made the point that capital flows are exogenous to domestic monetary policy in the 
case of Korea.     
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NFA  and testing the null hypothesis that NFA  in not endogenous in this regression.  
The basic idea of the test holds that if NFA is endogenous in equation 1, then tv must be 
correlated with NDA .  Thus, if we reject this hypothesis that NDA is endogenous then 
2SLS must be utilized.  
We utilize a reduced-form equation, given by equation 2, similar to Huang 
(1995).  This model can be estimated efficiently with OLS since it is a reduced-form 
model. The variable D Fr r  reflects the differential between domestic and foreign interest 
rates.  It is also an ad hoc proxy of the opportunity cost of holding international reserves. 
The variable  X reflects the change in exports and it acts as the proxy for the scale 
variable in the absence of quarterly GDP data for each country under study. The error 
term ( tv ) and its estimated values ( tv ) is inserted into equation 1 and the coefficient on 
this variable is tested using a t-test to determine whether the NDA is endogenous.           
0 1 2( )t D F t t tNFA b b r r b X v           (2) 
 The data series are sourced from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
Since we are applying a time series model, we tested for unit roots for X , NFA and 
NDA , p and D Fr r .  The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test reveals that except for 
D Fr r all the data series are I (0) at least at the 10 percent significance level (see 
Appendix 1).  However, we wish to note that the unit root tests should not take 
precedence over the theoretical notion that interest rates have to be anchored at a long-
term natural rate. It simply means the sample period is not long enough to reflect this 
anchoring. In addition, the article proposes a model which takes as given the notion of a 
theoretically stable relationship between the domestic and foreign interest rates.  For each 
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central bank, except for the ECCU and Suriname, the domestic interest rate is measured 
by the 3-month Treasury bill rate.  Given the difficulty in obtaining the Treasury bill rate 
for Suriname, we use the domestic money market rate.  For the same reason we employ 
the 3-month deposit rate for the ECCU (obtained from the Annual Financial Statistical 
Yearbook).  In order to proxy the foreign interest rate for each country, the 3-month US 
Treasury bill rate is used. 
 The estimation for each economy, except Guyana, is done for the period 1993:Q1 
to 2008:Q2.  For Guyana the sample starts at 1994:Q1 owing to missing CPI data in the 
IFS electronic data set.  This sample period is chosen to maximize observations and also 
capture the post 1990 period of financial openness and reform in the various territories.  
Following Aizenman and Glick (2008), NDA and NFA are scaled by RM. In addition, 
using the first difference of the two asset classes reduces the likelihood of spurious 
regression problem.  As noted earlier, the distributed lag model is utilized to model the 
reaction function.  Therefore, in order to select the parsimonious model Wald F-tests and 
t-tests were used to simplify a general model with four quarter lags of each variable, 
except the seasonal dummy variables.  The Ramsey RESET specification test is also used 
– before variables were eliminated – to determine whether any independent variable 
should enter the model with cubic and quadratic terms.  We test for heteroskedasticity 
and first and second order serial correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey LM and LM tests 
respectively.  If heteroskedasticity is only found, the White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are computed.  If both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are found 
then the Newey-West heteroskedaticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard 
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errors are computed
10
. The final models are then selected once they satisfy the various 
diagnostic tests.                 
4. Estimation Results  
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficient along with diagnostic tests for each 
economy.  It is important to note that our t-test test shows no statistically significant 
correlation between the estimated errors of the reduced form equation 2 and NDA . 
Thus we continue the estimation exercise with OLS estimation rather than 2SLS.     
The results indicate a noticeable variation in sterilization policy across the Caribbean.  
Three of the Caribbean‟s more successful fixed exchange rate regimes – the Bahamas (-
0.62), Barbados (-0.83) and Belize (-0.83) – have pursued some form of consistent 
sterilization policy.  Guyana appears to sterilize approximately 100% of capital flows.  
This amounts to the highest coefficient for the region. The lagged dependent variable is 
also statistically significant in the model for Guyana; however, this variable is not 
statistically significant for the other economies (for Trinidad and Tobago this variable is 
significant at the 7% level).  Suriname has more of an intermediate strategy with a 
coefficient of -0.5.  Trinidad and Tobago, classified by the IMF as a pegged exchange 
rate regime, sterilizes on average 70 % of capital inflows.        
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 See Verbeek (2004) for discussion of the technical details of White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and the HAC standard errors.   
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Table 3. Estimation of the sterilization coefficients 
Country Estimation results 
The 
Bahamas 
4
( 0.662) ( 0.000) ( 0.032)
/ 0.003 0.62 / 0.05
p val p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM D
     
      
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = -1.35 (p-val = 0.181) 
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 0.78 (p-val = 0.382) 
Adj-R
2
 = 0.71 
Newey-West HAC standard errors were used because both error serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity were found.  
Barbados *
4
( 0.270) ( 0.000) ( 0.033) ( 0.000)
/ 0.01 0.83 / 0.75 0.09
p val p val p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM p p D
       
         
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = -0.02 (p-val = 0.950)  
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 2.07 (p-val = 0.155) 
Adj-R
2
 = 0.75 
Serial corr. LM test (1
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 0.16 (p-val = 0.688) 
Serial corr. LM test (2
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 1.00 (p-val = 0.606) 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used because error heteroskedasticity 
was present.  
Belize 
( 0.123) ( 0.000)
/ 0.02 0.83 /
p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM
   
     
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = -0.92 (p-val = 0.114) 
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 1.49 (p-val = 0.226)  
Adj-R
2
 = 0.65 
Newey-West HAC standard errors were used because both error serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity were found. 
ECCU 
3 4
( 0.840) ( 0.026) ( 0.039) ( 0.000)
/ 0.001 0.18 / 0.02 0.03
p val p val p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM D D
       
        
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = -0.05 (p-val = 0.937)  
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 0.19 (p-val = 0.657) 
Adj-R
2
 = 0.30 
Newey-West HAC standard errors were utilized. 
Guyana 
1
( 0.037) ( 0.000) 0.000 ( 0.000)
/ 0.05 1.03 / 2.69 0.07 /t t S t
p val p val p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM g NDA RM 
       
        
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = -0.03 (p-val = 0.975)  
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 0.1 (p-val = 0.684) 
Adj-R
2
 = 0.90 
Serial corr. LM test (1
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 1.5 (p-val = 0.215) 
Serial corr. LM test (2
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 1.53 (p-val = 0.466) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test: n × R
2
 = 0.49 (p-val = 0.919) 
Jamaica 
1
( 0.003) ( 0.072) ( 0.031)
/ 0.04 0.16 / 0.02
p val p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM D
     
      
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = -0.03 (p-val = 0.975)  
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 0.17 (p-val = 0.685) 
Adj-R
2
 = 0.12 
Serial corr. LM test (1
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 0.09 (p-val = 0.767) 
Serial corr. LM test (2
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 0.09 (p-val = 0.767) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test: n × R
2
 = 0.94 (p-val = 0.625) 
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Suriname 
( 0.025) ( 0.001) ( 0.021)
/ 0.04 0.50 / 0.26
p val p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM p
     
      
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = 0.23 (p-val = 0.735)  
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 0.38 (p-val = 0.536) 
Adj-R
2
 = 0.31 
Serial corr. LM test (1
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 1.44 (p-val = 0.229) 
Serial corr. LM test (2
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 1.68 (p-val = (0.431) 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were estimated. 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 
1
( 0.626) ( 0.001) ( 0.081) ( 0.070)
/ 0.01 0.70 / 0.07 3 0.2 /t t t
p val p val p val p val
NDA RM NFA RM D NDA RM 
       
        
Endogeneity test for NFA : t-stat = 0.18 (p-val = 0.670) 
Ramsey RESET: F-stat = 2.4 (p-val = 0.140) 
Adj-R
2
 = 0.40 
Serial corr. LM test (1
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 0.22 (p-val = 0.642) 
Serial corr. LM test (2
st
 ord.): n × R
2
 = 0.22 (p-val = (0.642) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test: n × R
2
 = 5.3 (p-val = 0.147) 
 
In the case of Jamaica – which was classified as a managed float – the coefficient 
turned out to be the lowest estimate of -0.16. This result suggests that the Bank of 
Jamaica is more concerned with an exchange rate rather than a money anchor. The 
ECCB, which maintains another very successful peg in the region, neutralizes on average 
18% of capital flows.  The result for the ECCB is more in line with expectation that the 
money supply in a fixed exchange rate currency board arrangement ought to be 
endogenous. For Barbados while the inflation term was statistically insignificant, we 
found the inflation gap – actual (p) minus trend (p*) – to be statistically significant with 
the correct sign.  
A simple average of the region‟s sterilization coefficient would equal -0.58, 
which is higher than the approximately 35% index reported for the Caribbean by Jara and 
Tovar (2008).  However, these findings are, on average, lower than the estimates reported 
by Aizenman and Glick (2008) for several large emerging economies.  
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5. Dual Nominal Anchors?  
One can conclude from our empirical results that Barbados, Belize, Guyana, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and to a lesser extent, the Bahamas, pursue two nominal anchors. 
On the other hand, the ECCU takes the money supply as endogenous to the exchange rate 
target. This result is not surprising because the ECCU maintains a currency board 
arrangement. The results raise the question as to how it is possible for highly open 
economies to maintain two anchors over a fairly long period. The money neutrality thesis 
tells us that both the real exchange rate and the real money supply are independent of the 
nominal exchange rate and the nominal money supply in the long-run (Montiel, 2003).  
Khatkhate and Short (1980), relying on the standard Mundell-Fleming model, noted that 
monetary policy in mini states would not be independent as it engenders interest rate 
changes that lead to counteracting financial flows.  Similar arguments were also made by 
Obstfeld (1982) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).       
We conjecture that an analysis of the apparent puzzle should focus on the rigidity 
of interest rate in the presence of monetary shocks. This stems from the oligopolistic 
nature of the banking system. Typically the main participants in the domestic and capital 
markets are oligopolistic commercial banks, which have the ability to determine deposit 
and lending rates relative to a foreign benchmark interest rate.  Data taken from the 
World Bank‟s Financial Structure Dataset (2010) suggests high bank asset concentration 
in the economies under study. The 3-bank asset concentration ratios are as follows: 0.94 
(the Bahamas), 0.96 (Barbados), 0.96 (Belize), 0.94 (Guyana), 0.91 (Jamaica) and 0.84 
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(Trinidad and Tobago).
11
 The uncompetitive nature of the banking systems in the 
Caribbean is also highlighted in Moore and Craigwell (2002) who reported evidence of 
the importance of oligopoly market power in determining interest rate spreads in the 
Region.           
  The analytical framework presented herein is a simple model of interest rate 
pass-through from monetary policy to domestic interest rates that precludes the offsetting 
capital movements predicted by the UIP theory and the IS-LM-BP model. Monetary 
policy would not have the necessary interest rate pass-through when the aggregate bank 
liquidity preference curve is flat. Commercial banks are known to hold foreign assets in 
addition to domestic assets such as private loans, government securities and bank 
reserves (required and excess). Therefore, the foreign interest rate – for example the risk 
free US Treasury bill rate – will become the benchmark rate when banks need to decide 
on investing in domestic versus foreign assets.    
The paper proposes the notion that the domestic mark-up interest rate is identified 
by an aggregate commercial bank liquidity preference curve that is flat (see Appendix 1 
for evidence of flat aggregate bank liquidity preference curves).  For instance, imagine 
graphing non-remunerated bank reserves against a domestic rate (such as the Treasury 
bill rate).  At the point where the curve is horizontal it signals that non-remunerated 
reserves and the domestic government security are perfect substitutes.  They become 
perfect substitutes because a threshold minimum rate has been reached.  We conjecture 
that this threshold rate is a mark-up rate above a benchmark risk-free foreign rate.  When 
the threshold rate is binding, the banking system accumulates excess reserves in domestic 
currencies rather than even purchase government securities, let alone lend to the private 
                                                 
11
 Data for Suriname and the ECCU as a whole are unavailable. 
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sector.  At this point the banks prefer to invest all excess reserves into a safe foreign 
asset.  But not all is invested as there could be a shortage in foreign exchange in the 
domestic foreign exchange market.  The shortage could occur in spite of the fact that 
commercial banks are major participants in the domestic foreign exchange market. Thus 
excess liquidity is accumulated voluntarily and this is signified as a flat bank liquidity 
demand curve at the interest rate threshold or mark-up rate.      
While the hypothesis of a flat liquidity preference curve is akin to the classic 
liquidity trap, money and the government security are not perfectly substitutable at zero 
interest rate as Keynes had postulated the thesis in 1936 [see Keynes (1936: 207-208)  
reprinted 1994].  Instead the threshold rate occurs above zero, thus signaling it is a 
minimum rate the banks require before they can invest in the domestic government 
security.  Although not identical to the thesis of this paper, a similar idea was presented 
by Frost (1971). However, Frost proposed a stable bank excess reserves curve that is 
kinked at a Treasury bill rate close to zero (that is between 0.3 and 0.5 percent). 
According to Frost, profit-maximizing banks incur brokerage fees (or transaction costs) 
which are higher than the market rate earned on Treasury bills – thus the curve is kinked 
at this point to signal a more elastic accumulation of excess reserves.    
The domestic threshold rate is given by the simple equation min (1 )dom Fr m r  ; 
whereby mindomr = the domestic minimum rate that is reached at the flat curve, m = the mark 
up factor that could be determined by bank preferences, risk, market power and other 
factors, and Fr is the foreign risk-free rate that serves as the benchmark for Caribbean 
economies.  The basic idea is sketched in figure 1, which shows that when the threshold 
rate ( mindomr ) is binding an expansion of bank reserves (by the central bank) along the flat 
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liquidity preference curve (RD) – to the right of RS1 – would have no effect in driving 
down this rate. In addition, the threshold rate is assumed to be set favorably relative to 
Fr in order to prevent a flight of capital by the public as the banks would prefer to 
mobilize such funds (in the form of deposits) for themselves to invest in foreign assets.  
Commercial banks would also seek to mobilize foreign exchange from the domestic 
market to meet the foreign exchange needs of long established business customers 
(especially those who have outstanding business loans and exposure to international 
trade).  On the other hand, should the central bank contract bank reserves by selling to 
banks government securities (G), then the domestic rate may increase above the threshold 
to 1domr .  In this case there is the concomitant effect of an increase in government 
securities held by the banks from G1 to G2.   
The essence of figure 1 is this – the domestic banking system, owing to its 
oligopolistic nature, determines interest rate in such a manner that the rate is favorable 
relative to the foreign benchmark rate.  The banks are able do this because one of their 
core business operations involves foreign exchange trading (in the domestic foreign 
exchange market in which a finite quantity of hard currencies is bought and sold on any 
trading day), which is used by the banks to invest in foreign financial assets.  In other 
words, the deposit rate would be set in such a manner to encourage the public to deposit 
domestic currencies into the banks.  These funds are then allocated as domestic loans, 
government securities, and importantly in our context foreign assets. 
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Figure 1. Monetary policy and the threshold rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The diagrammatic framework could be looked at more formally. Equation 3 is the 
augmented UIP, whereby s = the spot exchange rate.   
(1 )dom Fr m r s          (3) 
 Given the nature of the liquidity preference curves in Appendix 1, it is possible to write 
the liquidity demand curve as a reciprocal function in which the threshold rate is the 
asymptote. *R represents the equilibrium level of excess reserves at the point where 
RD RS .  is the coefficient in the function where 0  and min 0domr  .  
min * 1
dom domr r R
         (4)  
 Substituting equation 4 into 3 gives 
min * 1( )(1 )dom Fr R m r s
          (5)  
Therefore, 
Excess Reserves (R) 
Government Securit ies (G) 
Domestic  
Interest Rate 
min
domr
G 
RD 
RS1 RS2 
G1 G2 
1
domr
 20 
* 2
*
(1 )
ds
m R
dR
           (6) 
The derivative suggests that as *R  the term 
*
0
ds
dR
  once the threshold rate is 
binding.     
6. Conclusion 
This study estimates the sterilization coefficient for several Caribbean economies.  
Our results show that several highly open economies with pegged exchange rate regimes 
possess high sterilization coefficients.  In other words, these Caribbean countries 
maintain both money and foreign exchange targets. This finding is intriguing since theory 
suggests it is not possible to have two nominal anchors in the long-term.  
It is well established that several Caribbean economies have successfully 
maintained fixed exchange rate regimes since the 1970s (see for instance Worrell, 2003).  
Our study finds that three of these economies – Barbados and Belize and to a lesser 
extent the Bahamas – were engaged in active sterilization over the review period.  We 
also find a similar result for Trinidad and Tobago.  Guyana, a country with a supposed 
managed float (Guyana was recently classified by the IMF as an economy with a fixed 
peg), has the most active sterilization regime as suggested by the econometric results.  
The estimated sterilization coefficient for Jamaica, the ECCU and Suriname was 
relatively lower. This suggests that Jamaica‟s central bank is more concerned with a 
money target. On the other hand, in the ECCU the exchange rate target is paramount. 
This is not surprising as a currency board arrangement is maintained by the Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank. As an explanation of the puzzle, the article propose the notion 
that commercial banks with market power set interest rates in such a manner that it 
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precludes the central bank‟s monetary policy from engendering offsetting capital 
movements.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1. Unit root tests – Augmented Dickey-Fuller  
 
  
NFA
RM

 
NDA
RM

 
Inflation 
Interest 
rate  
Growth 
of 
exchange 
rate 
The Bahamas -4.0** -3.7** -6.2* -2 _ 
Barbados -8.5* -4.0** -6.9* -2 _ 
Belize -3.7** -6.9* -5.3* -1.7 _ 
ECCU -3.9** -5.8* _ -2.11 _ 
Guyana -3.9** -4.4* -3.2** -1.9 -2.81*** 
Jamaica -6.4* -8.3* -3.9* -1.6 -6.4* 
Suriname -6.1* -3.5** -2.9*** _ _ 
Trinidad and 
Tobago -3.8** -3.5** -1.0 -2.0 -3.2** 
 
* = significance at 1 percent; ** = significance at 5 percent; *** = significance at 10 percent. 
Optimal lag lengths were chosen by AIC. Interest rate is domestic rate minus foreign rate. 
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Table A2.  Foreign Direct Investment – selected years 
Foreign Direct Investment
Current US$ 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Antigua and Barbuda 22,774,074      43,115,926      65,865,065       80,366,585        213,555,967     374,375,900       390,946,346    
Barbados 14,800,000      18,350,000      16,950,000       NA 52,800,000       NA NA
The Bahamas 145,900,000    250,250,000    152,790,000     273,600,000      563,414,700     706,390,000       713,340,000    
Belize 13,150,000      23,340,762      25,386,720       111,431,922      125,927,476     103,256,902       125,994,928    
Dominica 6,511,111       17,596,296      20,110,637       26,173,948        19,235,559       26,777,878         46,424,234      
Grenada 48,685,185      37,407,407      54,488,889       65,014,333        70,157,130       85,170,044         139,502,464    
Guyana 44,000,000      67,100,000      43,600,000       30,000,000        76,800,000       102,390,000       152,400,000    
Jamaica 287,100,000    394,000,000    407,200,000     541,644,805      581,470,000     796,780,000       751,496,215    
St. Kitts and Nevis 31,925,926      96,214,815      79,771,689       46,141,844        92,994,489       110,415,633       142,595,605    
St. Lucia 83,396,296      53,748,148      51,935,415       76,520,285        78,233,430       233,934,815       260,932,784    
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 88,951,852      37,744,444      34,048,256       65,686,167        40,087,315       109,112,344       91,644,831      
Trinidad and Tobago 729,767,481    654,300,035    684,300,000     1,123,500,000   1,280,700,000   1,550,000,000    NA
Source: World Development Indicators  
 
 
 
Table A3. Workers remittances – selected years 
Workers Remittances 
Current US$ 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Antigua and Barbuda 12,000,000      10,000,000      6,000,000         20,900,000        22,000,000       23,000,000         23,512,000      
Barbados 76,000,000      102,000,000    109,000,000     109,300,000      140,000,000     140,000,000       140,000,000    
The Bahamas NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Belize 23,000,000      22,000,000      29,000,000       34,960,000        46,100,000       65,490,000         74,800,000      
Dominica 3,000,000       3,000,000       4,000,000         23,150,000        24,978,000       25,371,000         25,978,000      
Grenada 20,000,000      22,000,000      23,000,000       72,192,000        51,567,000       53,941,000         55,416,000      
Guyana 15,000,000      27,000,000      51,000,000       153,000,000      201,300,000     218,080,000       278,496,000    
Jamaica 654,700,000    789,500,000    1,130,600,000  1,465,796,250   1,621,220,000   1,769,390,000    1,964,319,819 
St. Kitts and Nevis 4,000,000       4,000,000       3,000,000         31,304,000        33,522,000       36,239,000         37,252,000      
St. Lucia 3,000,000       3,000,000       2,000,000         28,650,000        29,460,000       30,308,000         31,087,000      
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3,000,000       3,000,000       4,000,000         25,517,000        26,486,000       29,728,000         30,548,000      
Suriname NA NA 15,000,000       9,100,000          3,900,000         2,100,000           139,900,000    
Trinidad and Tobago 45,000,000      38,000,000      79,000,000       86,900,000        92,400,000       92,400,000         92,400,000      
Source: World Development Indicators  
 
 
 
A4. Portfolio investments 
Portfolio Investments 
Current US$ 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Antigua and Barbuda (285,185)            2,340,741          (2,171,037)          12,099,778           10,528,400          24,783,866            (6,012,015)         
Barbados (54,650,000)       71,100,000        (33,600,000)        (68,150,000)         21,850,000          NA NA
The Bahamas NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Belize NA NA NA NA NA 40,000,000            NA
Dominica 529,630             13,629,630        12,109,104          (2,466,086)           3,783,185            (103,232)               2,476,192          
Grenada 30,000               19,450,000        107,670,000        30,040,000           17,800,000          (750,000)               650,000             
Guyana NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Jamaica 7,000,000          (64,100,000)       (195,500,000)      96,000,000           (126,000,000)       (128,520,000)         (640,440,000)     
St. Kitts and Nevis 2,233,333          4,996,296          30,362,897          (9,839,259)           (15,024,104)         (20,964,030)           (19,190,652)       
St. Lucia 3,322,222          28,385,185        16,866,674          16,288,887           24,045,374          (2,964,316)            (2,584,235)         
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (114,815)            1,444,444          1,002,963           33,171,155           (8,194,323)           12,511,213            (1,511,704)         
Trinidad and Tobago (396,932)            (30,000,002)       (70,100,000)        (690,100,000)       (258,200,000)       NA NA
Source: World Development Indicators  
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Aggregate bank liquidity preference curves 
In order to extract the liquidity preference curves, we utilize a technique outlined 
by Cleveland (1993).  The technique is that of locally weighted least squares regressions.  
Robust weights were utilized to minimize the effects of outliners on the curve.  A 
smoothing parameter of 0.4 was used for all the economies.  Figures A1 to A5 report the 
extracted aggregate liquidity preference curve for five economies.  We did not report the 
curves for the ECCU and Suriname because the Treasury bill rate is unavailable; 
however, while the rate is available for Belize for much of the sample period it is fixed at 
3.5 percent and 6 percent.  Thus the curve for the Belize banking system could not be 
obtained.  
 The extracted curves suggest that the threshold rate for Guyana equals 
approximately 4 percent, Jamaica 16 percent, Barbados 3.5 percent, The Bahamas 1.5 
percent, and Trinidad and Tobago 6 percent.   
 
 
Figure A1. Guyana: bank liquidity preference curve (1994:Q1 – 2008: Q2) 
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Figure A2. Jamaica: bank liquidity preference curve (1993:Q1 – 2008: Q2) 
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Figure A3. Barbados: bank liquidity preference curve (1993:Q1 – 2008: Q2) 
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Figure A4. The Bahamas: bank liquidity preference curve (1993:Q1 – 2008: Q2) 
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Figure A5. Trinidad and Tobago: bank liquidity preference curve (1993:Q1 – 2008: Q2) 
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